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HUMAN RIGHTS IN JEWISH LAW: CONTEMPORARY
JURISTIC AND RABBINIC CONCEPTIONS
DAVID WERMUTH*
1.

INTRODUCTION: HUMAN RIGHTS AND ISRAEL

Many have critiqued and condemned the State of Israel for
alleged human rights violations.1 The upsurge of violence over the
past few years between Israel and terrorist organizations in Gaza
and Lebanon have evoked vitriolic condemnation of Israel‘s
actions in defense of its security and its citizens.2 The human
rights allegations lodged against Israel have led some to question
whether the Jewish character of the state affects this alleged neglect
of human rights to the Arab population in and surrounding Israel.3
Jewish law—as part of the Jewish character embodied by the
State of Israel—plays a crucial role in understanding the concept of
human rights as developed by Jewish communities throughout

* J.D. Candidate, University of Pennsylvania Law School, 2011.
1 E.g., Human Rights Council Res. S-12/1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/HRC/S-12/1
(Oct. 21, 2009) (condemning Israel‘s actions to limit Palestinians‘ access to their
properties and holy sites, particularly in Occupied East Jerusalem).
2 See, e.g., Middle East Human Rights Groups Call on the General Assembly to
Adopt the Goldstone Report, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Nov. 3, 2009),
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/11/03/middle-east-human-rights-groupscall-general-assembly-adopt-goldstone-report (praising the Goldstone report for
calling on Israeli and Palestinian armed forces to investigate human rights and
war violations); see Fred Abrahams, On Israel, Congress Tolerates Abuse, HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH (Nov. 4, 2009), http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/11
/04/israel-congress-tolerates-abuse (criticizing the House of Representatives‘ vote
condemning the Goldstone report). See also Justice Richard Goldstone, Statement
on behalf of the Members of the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza
Conflict, Address before the U.N. Human Rights Council 12th Session (Sept. 29,
2009) (discussing the investigation of human rights violations in the Gaza Conflict
and condemning some of Israel‘s conduct in this conflict); Human Rights Council
Res. S-9/L. 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/HRC/S-9/L.1 (Jan. 12, 2009) (condemning
Israel‘s military operation in occupied Palestinian territory).
3 See generally Ruth Gavison, The Jews‟ Right To Statehood: A Defense, 15 AZURE
70 (2003) (arguing that Israel‘s long-term viability relies on a clear rationale for a
Jewish state).
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Jewish history, and as understood by some Jews in Israel today.
Most of Jewish law developed while Jews were a minority,
dispersed among mainly intolerant and belligerent Gentile
majorities. The jurisprudence of human rights laws and values
during these periods reflects this situation. However, for the first
time in over eighteen centuries, the modern State of Israel creates a
striking contrast to the past epochs of Jewish history, by
establishing Jewish sovereignty and a Gentile minority under
Jewish authority. This drastic change in Jewish existence forced
Jewish law scholars to confront the gaps in Jewish human rights
laws as they pertain to Gentiles. Rabbis, Jewish law scholars
internal to the Jewish law tradition, and members of the Israeli
Judiciary offer different jurisprudential methods for reconciling
modern human rights laws and values with the corpora of Jewish
law.
The divergences and convergences of human rights
jurisprudence between (1) how the concept of human rights
developed in Jewish law before statehood, and (2) how several
modern Jewish law thinkers approach human rights in Jewish law,
along with (3) how those compare to the methods used by the
Israeli Supreme Court when it incorporates Jewish law into its
discussions on human rights, demonstrate how Jewish law—as
part of the Jewish nature of the State of Israel—does not per se
contribute to the human rights problems facing Israel today.
2.

THE INFLUENCE OF JEWISH LAW IN ISRAEL TODAY

Jewish law assumes an uncertain place in the Israeli legal
system. Scholars disagree as to Jewish law‘s legal weight in the
Israeli judicial system. Some claim that Jewish law in the Israeli
court system functions merely as ―a decoration and not as serious
source of substantive law.‖4 Others have argued that Jewish law
plays a substantive and crucial role in the interpretation of valueladen terms, such as equity, public policy, and good faith, and at
times serves as the sole basis for a particular Supreme Court
decision.5 Regardless, the Israeli Supreme Court has stated that it
will employ Jewish law only insofar as it does not conflict with
4 M. Bass & D. Cheshin, Jewish Law in the Judgments of the Supreme Court of the
State of Israel, 1 JEWISH L. ANN. 200, 212 (1978).
5 See 4 MENACHEM ELON, JEWISH LAW: HISTORY, SOURCES, PRINCIPLES 1730
(Bernard Auerbach & Melvin J. Sykes trans., 1994) (―[I]n not a few cases [Jewish
law] has served as the principal source for the Supreme Court‘s decision.‖).
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secular law.6 Due to the fact that only a few Supreme Court
justices received training in Jewish law, decisions incorporating
Jewish law account for a relatively minor proportion of Israeli
Supreme Court decisions.
However, while Jewish law may not carry much weight in the
Israeli legal system, it has great importance for the religious Jewish
community in Israel. For religious Jews, Jewish law discusses and
designates the proper course of action for Jews in all areas of life.
Those who believe in Jewish law‘s divine approbation follow its
mandates out of religious obligation, even though no formal
authoritative religious court charged with enforcing its rulings
exists. Many religious Jews believe that once the Messiah comes
and brings redemption to the world, Jewish law will once again
serve as the law for the Jewish State of Israel.
In Israel today, most religious Zionists relate to the state of
Israel on religious terms. The influential and at times extreme
messianic religious Zionists, greatly affected by the teachings of
Rabbi Zvi Yehuda HaCohen Kook, believe that the Jewish return to
Israel marks the beginning of the Redemption and the coming of
the Messiah.7 Realizing the Redemption will bring about the telos
for which Jews have waited since the destruction of the Second
Temple in 70 C.E. Nevertheless, the fact that they believe they are
living in the beginning of the redemptive period affects the way
they relate to Jewish law as it pertains to the land of Israel. For
Messianists, these religious laws trump secular laws whenever the
observance of secular laws might hinder the realization of the
Redemption. The Israeli population experienced this when Israel
dismantled and relocated the population of several Israeli towns
located in the Gaza Strip in 2005. At the time, many rabbis claimed
that removing Jews from Israel violated Jewish law, and many
religious soldiers refused orders to remove Israelis from their

6 Cf. HCJ 390/79 Dwaikat v. State of Israel 34(1) IsrSC 1, 17 [1980], translated
in ITZHAK ZAMIR & ALLEN ZYSBLAT, PUBLIC LAW IN ISRAEL 383 (1996) (stating that
Israel is ―a state where the Halakha (religious law) is applied only in so far as
secular law allows it‖).
7 See generally AVIEZER RAVITZKY, MESSIANISM, ZIONISM, AND JEWISH RELIGIOUS
RADICALISM 79–144 (Michael Swirsky & Jonathan Chipman trans., 1996) (offering a
detailed theological overview of the teachings and beliefs of messianic religious
Zionism).
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homes in Gaza.8 The pullout from Gaza caused extreme social
unrest and widened the gap between the messianic religious
community and the rest of Israel‘s population.9 While Jewish law
may not have significant influence in the secular Israeli court
system, it may still have profound legal reach. The conclusions
that modern rabbis reach when relying on Jewish law as their
authority have the power to convince faithful messianic religious
Zionists to go so far as to break secular law if the alternative
somehow stands in the way of realizing the destiny of the Jewish
people in Israel.
3.

HUMAN RIGHTS IN JEWISH LAW OF EARLIER PERIODS

3.1. Biblical Law
Biblical law provides both universal and national guidelines.
In many instances, the Bible explicitly states to whom certain laws
apply. In Deuteronomy chapter 15, the Bible details a social
welfare program that dissolves debts every seven years for citizens
8 For an interesting discussion of rabbi-led protests to prevent soldiers from
removing Jews from their homes in Gaza, see Dan Izenberg, Yesha Rabbis Preach
Mitzva of Stopping Pullout, JERUSALEM POST, Aug. 17, 2005, at 3, available at
http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/jpost/access/888719051.html?dids=888719051:8887
88871&FMT=ABS&FMTS=ABS:FT&date=Aug+17,+2005&author=DAN+IZENBEI
Z&pub=Jerusalem+Post&edition=&startpage=03&desc=Yesha+rabbis+preach+mi
tzva+of+stopping+pullout. Perhaps as a result of the protests, an unknown
number of soldiers during this time refused to follow these orders requiring
disengagement. See also Yaakov Katz, Rabbis Say No to Violence, Yes to Breaking the
Law, JERUSALEM POST, Apr. 8, 2005, at 1, available at http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com
/jpost/access/820193791.html?dids=820193791:820182019&FMT=ABS&FMTS=A
BS:FT&type=current&date=Apr+8,+2005&author=YYAAKO+KATZ,+Gil+Hoffm
an+contributed+to+this+report.&pub=Jerusalem+PoPo&edition=&startpage=01&
desc=Rabbis+say+no+to+violence,+yes+to+breaking+the+law (quoting rabbis as
saying that contributing to the evacuation of settlements for non-Jews violates the
Torah and is immoral); Margot Dudkevitch, IDF: Few Will Refuse Pullout Orders,
JERUSALEM POST, May 17, 2005, at 2, available at http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com
/jpost/access/841180831.html?dids=841180831:841184118&FMT=ABS&FMTS=A
BS:FT&type=current&date=May+17,+2005&author=MARGOT+DUDKEVITCH&
pub=Jerusalem+Post&edition=&stastartp=02&desc=IDF:+Few+will+refuse+pullo
ut+orders (stating that the army did not expect many soldiers to refuse orders to
participate in the disengagement).
9 See Dina Kraft, Defiant Young People Vow to Resist the Gaza Pullout, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 15, 2005, at A8 (contrasting the calls for peaceful protests issued by
prominent members of the Israeli religious community with violent, civilian-led
protests and riots following the decision by Israel‘s government to withdraw from
the Gaza Strip).
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but not for foreigners.10 In chapter 23 of the same book, the Bible
explicitly prohibits collecting interest from citizens, while expressly
permitting usury vis-à-vis foreigners.11 Likewise, in Genesis
chapter 9, the Bible records that the murder of any human being
shall be punishable by death, for God has created humanity in
God‘s own image.12 In Leviticus chapter 24, the Bible offers one
manner of law pertaining to all human beings regarding
compensatory damages when one person maims another person.13
However, the bulk of Biblical law does not carry with it an
explicit audience. When silent, whom does the law intend to
protect? For example:
Thou shalt not murder. Thou shalt not commit adultery.
Thou shalt not steal. Thou shalt not bear false witness
against thy neighbor. Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor‘s
house; thou shalt not covet thy neighbor‘s wife, nor his
man-servant, nor his maid-servant, nor his ox, nor his ass,
nor any thing that is thy neighbor‘s.14
Who shall one not murder? With whose spouse shall one not lie?
From whom shall one not steal? These latent ambiguities might
seem easily answerable to the modern reader—they obviously
apply universally. When understood universally, these laws from
the Decalogue—the inviolability of life, family, and property—
make up the bedrock of human rights in the ancient world.
Yet, most ancient Jewish legal scholars did not interpret the law
in this way. For them, such passages only refer to Jewish victims.
This dialectic—the allegiance to legal precedent and the imperative
of modern mores—poses a great challenge for contemporary
Jewish legal scholars.
The modern Jewish legal scholar‘s
interpretation of the scope of such laws will depend in part on the
10 See Deuteronomy 15:2–3 (Jewish Publication Society of America) (―[E]very
creditor shall remit the due that he claims from his neighbor; he shall not dun his
neighbor or kinsman . . . . You may dun the foreigner; but you must remit
whatever is due you from your kinsmen.‖).
11 See Deuteronomy 23:20–21 (Jewish Publication Society of America) (―You
shall not deduct interest from loans to your countryman . . . . You may deduct
interest from loans to foreigners.‖).
12 See Genesis 9:6 (Jewish Publication Society of America) (decrying the
murder of human beings, ―[f]or in the image of God/Was man created‖).
13 Leviticus 24:17–22 (Jewish Publication Society of America).
14 Exodus 20:13–14 (Jewish Publication Society of America).
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balance he strikes between strict loyalty to prior interpretations
and modern moral sensibilities.
3.2. Rabbinic Law
The Rabbinic period in Judaism began immediately following
the destruction of the second temple in Jerusalem in 70 C.E.15 In
this period, the oral legal traditions of Judaism were found in
written form in the Mishnah and several other works by Jewish
legal scholars called Tannaim.16 Study of these works—especially
of the Mishnah—by the Amoraim led to the codification of the
Babylonian and Palestinian Talmuds, the authoritative
commentaries on the Mishnah.17 These legal texts from the
Tannaitic and Amoraic eras in the Rabbinic period comprise the
ancient corpus of Jewish law.
Rabbinic exegesis of Biblical law preferred parochial and selfinterested interpretations. In Exodus 21:14 the Bible elaborates on
the prohibition of murder: ―[a]nd if a man come presumptuously
upon his neighbor, to slay him with guile; thou shalt take him from
Mine altar, that he may die.‖18 The Mekhilta, a Tannaitic work,
interprets this verse as follows: by referring to the murderer as the
generic ―man,‖ the Bible intends to make the scope of the
command universal.19 Thus, any murderer shall be punished with
death. However, by referring to the victim with the closer relation,
―neighbor,‖ the Bible intends that murder only be punishable by

15 See Jacob Neusner, “Pharisaic-Rabbinic” Judaism: A Clarification, 12 HIST.
RELIGIONS 250, 250 (1973) (―[T]he rabbinic Heilsgeschichte . . . regards the rabbis
known after the destruction of the Second Temple in A.D. 70 as the heirs and
continuators of the Pharisees of the period before that time.‖).
16 See LAWRENCE H. SCHIFFMAN, FROM TEXT TO TRADITION: A HISTORY OF
SECOND TEMPLE & RABBINIC JUDAISM 177 (1991) (stating that in the Rabbinic period,
Mishnah was compiled and the oral Torah evolved into a fixed corpus which
replaced the written Torah as ―the main object of Jewish study‖).
17 See id. (arguing that the collection and editing of the Mishnah allowed
Rabbinic Judaism to expand to virtually all of the world‘s Jews). Cf. Neusner,
supra note 15, at 250 (―The oral Torah was seen to constitute a single, continuous
tradition, and its history would produce ‗Pharisaic-rabbinic‘ as readily as ‗Biblicaltalmudic‘ Judaism.‖).
18 Exodus 21:14 (Jewish Publication Society), available at http://www.israelbar-mitzvah.com/torah/exo021.htm#014).
19 See MEKHILTA D‘RABBI YISHMA‘EL, TRACTATE NEZIKIN, SECTION 4 (limiting
the scope of murder to the Jewish victims).
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death if the murderer kills a Jew.20 The passage ends with a very
cryptic line by the Tanna,21 Isi Ben Akiva, who posits:
Before the giving of the Bible, we were warned concerning
the spilling of blood. After the giving of the Bible, by [the
laws] being made stricter, they were also made more
lenient. In truth [the rabbis] said that [regarding one who
kills a Gentile] although exempt from temporal courts, his
judgment is handed over to heaven.22
The full extent of the prohibition against murder and its legal
repercussions—the axiomatic prohibition in human rights—does
not pertain to Gentiles, according to the Rabbinic legal tradition.
Although Jewish law formalistically denied Gentiles this basic
human rights protection, it provided two other legal mechanisms
to protect the rights of Gentiles. The first approach—which still
leaves much to be desired by modern standards—minimally
protects the rights of Gentiles for the sake of avoiding hostility and
reciprocal animosity. Thus, while a Jew must assist the burdened
animal of another Jew because of a Biblical command,23 he should
help the burdened animal of a Gentile only in order to avoid
inviting hostility from the Gentile population.24 Similarly, a female
Jew may act as a nursemaid for a Gentile baby for a wage only to
avoid engendering animosity.25 She may also deliver a Gentile
baby for a wage to avoid hostility.26 Lastly, a Jew who sees a
Gentile in a life-threatening situation should not save him unless

Id.
Tanna is the singular form of Tannaim.
22 MEKHILTA D‘RABBI YISHMA‘EL, TRACTATE NEZIKIN, SECTION 4.
23 See Exodus 23:5 (requiring Jews to assist the overburdened pack animals of
others).
24 See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, TRACTATE BAVA METZIA 32b (commanding Jews to
―tend to the animal of an idolater because of the need to prevent enmity‖).
25 See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, TRACTATE AVODAH ZARAH 26a (stating that it
must be for a wage because the supposed hostility grows from the disparity that
Jewish women will nurse Jewish babies for money, but not those of Gentiles).
Conversely, the Talmud here records another legal scholar‘s opinion that
prohibits nursing for a wage, rejecting the hostility argument. Id.
26 Id.
Another opinion in the Talmud prohibits Jewish midwifes from
assisting in the birth of a Gentile child on the Sabbath—even though she may
deliver a Jewish baby on that day—again rejecting the hostility argument.
20
21
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inaction would engender hostility.27 This legal principle moves
practice, albeit slightly, towards universal treatment in certain
human rights areas, such as childbirth, childcare, and burdened
animals, but does not otherwise afford much protection to
Gentiles.
The second principle, ―for the ways of peace,‖ enjoys greater
development in ancient Jewish law and garners more sympathy
from the modern reader. In part, this principle provides the
rationale for rabbinic legislation otherwise not included by formal
exegetical methods.28 Thus, while the law requires competence to
effectuate possession, the equitable principle, for the ways of
peace, protects the possessions of the insane.29 While the fruit of
trees growing in a private yard belongs to the owner of the land,
any fruit that falls from that tree into the public domain has no
owner. Nevertheless, for the ways of peace, a person may not
shake that tree to cause the fruit to fall into the public domain.30
Using this equitable principle, the Tannaim expanded the scope of
laws that facilitate an orderly society.
In this context, the principle for the ways of peace extends
certain legal protections to Gentiles. Economically, the Tannaim
included Gentiles within the scope of Jewish charity law; Jewish
farmers should allow poor Gentiles to benefit from the biblically
mandated social welfare programs afforded to the Jewish poor.31
In cities inhabited by Jews and Gentiles, the community charity
coffer should collect from and distribute to both groups.32 During
the sabbatical year—during which Jews may not engage in

27 Id.
Even though this law demonstrates apathy towards the lives of
Gentiles, in practice, it will cause Jews to save Gentile lives.
28 In broad strokes, this distinction parallels the law and equity distinction
from medieval Europe.
29 See MISHNA NASHIM, TRACTATE GITTIN 5:8 (asserting that the taking of the
found possession of an insane individual is in fact a form of theft).
30 See id. (stating that, equitably, the act of causing private fruit to fall into the
public domain and then taking it is considered theft).
31 See id. (restricting Jews from preventing ―the poor among the non-Jews
from gathering gleanings‖ and other benefits from social welfare programs
extended to poor Jews).
32 See TOSEFTA NASHIM, TRACTATE GITTIN 3:13 (requiring charity for Jew and
Gentile alike).
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agricultural activity—a Jew may assist a Gentile‘s agricultural
production (barring physical work on the land).33
Socially, the Tannaim included laws pertaining to universal
features of humanity, sickness, and death. Just as a Jew has a
positive commandment to visit ailing Jews, he must also visit sick
Gentiles.34 And in the event of a death, a Jew must impartially
ensure burial of the deceased (within the same cemetery if need
be), eulogize the departed, and console the mourners of the
deceased irrespective of the deceased‘s religious or national
affiliation.35 Finally, as a basic staple of human decency and
respect, a Jew must give salutations to Gentiles.36 To ensure the
observance of these basic needs—the need for food, the need for
dignity while ill and approaching death, and the need for basic
human respect and recognition—Jewish law created the equitable
principle for the ways of peace.
Following Biblical times, the Rabbinic period saw a narrowing
of human equality in Jewish law. Although the rabbis constrained
the default scope of Biblical law to members of the Jewish religion,
they were not devoid of sympathy for Gentiles; the rabbis
generated two legal mechanisms for affording equal protection for
certain basic human rights. Yet, these allowances for equality did
not trump religious obligations, as evidenced by the fact that one
legal opinion in the Talmud prohibited Jews from violating the
Sabbath to assist in the birth of a Gentile child.37 Furthermore, the
Talmud remained silent or vague as to the place of Gentiles in
many areas of law. Commentators throughout the Medieval and
Modern Eras have since attempted to fill in these gaps.

33 See MISHNA NASHIM, TRACTATE GITTIN 5:9 (stating that Jews can loan
neighbors suspected of ―transgressing the Sabbatical Year‖ sieves and other
farming tools during the sabbatical year, but may not ―winnow, or grind, or sift‖
with them; they can encourage Gentiles, but may not directly assist them in
working the land).
34 See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, TRACTATE GITTIN 61a (commanding Jews to ―visit
the Gentile sick along with the Jewish sick‖).
35 Id. See also TOSEFTA NASHIM, TRACTATE GITTIN 3:14 (requiring burial of Jew
and Gentile alike).
36 See MISHNA NASHIM, TRACTATE GITTIN 5:9 (encouraging Jews to offer
greetings to Gentiles ―for the sake of peace‖).
37 See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, TRACTATE AVODAH ZARAH 26a (prohibiting
Jewish midwifes from delivering the children of ―idolaters‖ on the Sabbath).
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3.3. Medieval Jewish Law
Since the destruction of the Temple in 70 CE, Jewish history has
been saturated with persecution, death, and destruction. With a
population dispersed throughout Europe, Africa, and the Middle
East, Jewish existence meant life as a discriminated minority. The
Middle Ages heightened this aspect of Jewish identity.
The Crusades greatly affected Jewish identity and Jewish
relations with Gentiles.38 The Mainz Anonymous, a particularly
horrific document claiming to recount the eradication of the Jewish
community in Mainz, Germany in 1096, reflects the intense
xenophobia and venomous hatred of the Christian majority who
murdered Jewish men and children, and raped and killed Jewish
women.39 The intensity of this xenophobia led many Jews to
commit suicide and to kill their own children rather than allow
them to be kidnapped and converted to Christianity.40 Such acts—
which had, until then, been unequivocally condemned by Jewish
law—found justification, or at a minimum, quiet acceptance, in
Jewish law and in contemporary religious leaders.41 Medieval
Jewish legalists chose to internalize these acts out of their
communal need to honor the actions of the thousands who died at
the hands of the crusaders and other persecutors. The Middle
Ages also witnessed countless burnings of sacred Jewish texts,
expulsions from almost all of the countries in Western Europe, and

38 See generally ROBERT CHAZAN, EUROPEAN JEWRY AND THE FIRST CRUSADE
(1987) (outlining the effects of the First Crusade upon the Jewish population in
Europe, with a particular emphasis on Jewish-Gentile relations during this
period).
39 See generally THE JEWS AND THE CRUSADERS: THE HEBREW CHRONICLES OF THE
FIRST AND SECOND CRUSADES 95–116 (Shlomo Eidelberg ed., trans., KTAV Pub.
House 1996) (offering a translation and detailed historical background of the
Mainz Anonymous).
40 Haym Soloveitchik, Religious Law and Change: The Medieval Ashkenazic
Example, 12 ASS‘N FOR JEWISH STUD REV. 205, 208–09 (1987) (―Parents slaughtered
their own children to prevent them from falling into Christian hands and being
raised as Christians, and even recited a blessing on the murder of themselves and
of their own children . . . .‖).
41 Id. at 209–10. One man in the Middle Ages sent a letter to Rabbi Maier of
Rothenburg asking what penance he should perform after slaughtering his
children in order to prevent them from ―falling into Christian hands.‖ Id.
Reportedly, the Rabbi was hard put to find a reply. Id.
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the destruction of thriving Jewish communities across Europe.42
As a minority thrust into this perilous situation for over 1000 years,
Jewish society, and Jewish legal interpretation, consequently
reflected an intensely xenophobic attitude.
Medieval Jewish legal scholarship reached its height with the
codification of Jewish law in the Shulhan Arukh. While many
interpretations of the ancient Jewish legal texts abounded during
the Middle Ages—with legal scholars in each community and
region prescribing proper Jewish practice—the Shulhan Arukh
enjoyed widespread acceptance in the Jewish world after its
printing in the 16th century.43 After its publication, a Jewish law
scholar could not begin to study the contemporary practice of
Jewish law without conferring with the near-authoritative Shulhan
Arukh. It stores the medieval consensus on Jewish law.44
The Shulhan Arukh contains several subunits on laws relating to
Gentiles.45 Consistent with one‘s expectations, given the place of
Jews during the Middle Ages, the codified law limits the extension
of human rights to Gentiles. Thus, a Jewish woman may not nurse
a Gentile child even for a wage.46 She may assist in the delivery of
a Gentile child under extremely limited circumstances, and may do
so only if the birth occurs during a weekday (not on the Sabbath or
any of the festivals), she receives a wage, and she has a reputation
42 See generally YITZHAK BAER, A HISTORY OF JEWS IN CHRISTIAN SPAIN (Jewish
Publication Society 1978) (describing the Diaspora, development, and persecution
of Jews in Spain from the eleventh century to the fifteenth century); JACOB RADER
MARCUS, THE JEW IN THE MEDIEVAL WORLD (Hebrew Union College Press 1999)
(chronicling Jewish persecution during the Middle Ages).
43 See Joseph Davis, The Reception of the Shulhan ‗Arukh and the Formation of
Ashkenazic Jewish Identity, 26 ASS‘N FOR JEWISH STUD. REV. 251, 252–53 (2002)
(detailing the reaction to the groundbreaking legal codification in the Shulhan
Arukh and its impact on Jewish identity).
44 Many legal opinions from the Medieval period still carry weight in
contemporary legal analysis. Because they differ by region, common history, and
surrounding majority population, it would take an entire paper to properly cover
these opinions. Instead I have opted to use the Shulhan Arukh as the legal
consensus, and to incorporate specific medieval legalists and their opinions as
they pertain to modern rabbinic legal arguments.
45 Even though the Shulhan Arukh contains many laws directly and indirectly
distrustful of Gentiles—and requiring strict separation from anything of religious
significance to Gentiles—I will limit my overview to laws directly pertaining to
human rights issues.
46 See SHULHAN ARUKH, YOREH DEAH 154:2 (prohibiting a Jewish woman from
nursing a Gentile child).
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in the community as a midwife; she would most likely engender
hostility if she refused to assist in the child‘s birth (apparently if
she did not have a reputation as a midwife, she could claim
ineptitude at midwifery and not engender animosity).47
Furthermore, the codified law prohibits a doctor from healing
Gentiles, except to avoid hostility, thus extending the prohibition
against saving the life of a Gentile except to avoid hostility.48
Similarly, the use of the principle for the ways of peace remained
narrow; the Shulhan Arukh lists the examples stated in the ancient
texts tersely and does not expand their scope.49 It also omits the
command for Jews to give salutations to Gentiles.
By the end of the Middle Ages, in light of the perennial societal
hardships and catastrophes suffered at the hands of the popular
majority, the Jewish law reflected a negative outlook on the rights
that a Jew must afford universally.
4.

MODERN ISRAELI APPROACHES TO HUMAN RIGHTS IN JEWISH
LAW

In 1948, Jewish history experienced an event with which it was
wholly unfamiliar during the prior eighteen hundred years—the
establishment of the State of Israel created a Jewish majority and
Jewish sovereignty for the Jewish people. Just as this event had
many ramifications for Jews worldwide and Jewish identity, it also
had great effects on Jewish law. Jewish law‘s development
throughout the previous centuries paid little attention, if any, to
the laws and principles connected with sovereignty. Statehood
demanded that scholars breathe new life into these areas of Jewish
law.
The intersection between modern universal human rights
values and the Jewish state is one of the areas that required
reinterpretation. Scholars within the Jewish legal system had to
determine what Jewish law says about human rights for all human
beings. The Jewish people had suffered continual discrimination
and destruction as a weak minority at the hands of a majority from
whom they differed. The hatred engendered by this history found
its way into Jewish law over the ages. However, majority status
47
48
49

Id.
Id. at 158:1.
Id. at 151:12, 235:9, 267:1.
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and statehood placed Jewish law scholars at a crossroads; would
they continue the theme of distrust and xenophobia towards the
Gentile minority within their land, or, after centuries of
experiencing minority status and persecution, would they decide
to remedy those ills for the minority over whom the Israeli
majority now had authority? As evidenced by the following five
legal opinions, rabbis contemporary with the State of Israel differ.
4.1. Shelomoh Goren
Rabbi Shelomoh Goren discusses a Gentile‘s right to life in
Jewish law. According to Goren, the printed text of the Mishnah
contains a substantive error. As published currently, the Mishnah
in Tractate Sanhedrin states, ―anyone who eradicates the life of a
person from Israel, it is as if he has eradicated an entire world.‖50
Given, however, that the early manuscripts omit the words ―from
Israel,‖ Goren infers that this admonition applies to the taking of
both Jewish and Gentile lives.51 He then quotes a Tanna, Ben Azai,
whom Goren interprets to assert that Jewish law has the value of
securing the lives of all human beings as one of its axiomatic
pillars.52 In sum, all human beings have a right to a dignified life,
because all human beings are created in the image of God.53
Goren also discusses the property rights of Gentiles under
Jewish law. Whether or not Gentiles may possess property rights
in a Jewish-controlled Israel turns mainly on the interpretation of
Exodus 23:33. The verse states, ―They shall not dwell in thy land—
lest they make thee sin against Me, for thou wilt serve their gods—
for they will be a snare unto thee.‖54 Maimonides, a medieval
Jewish legal scholar, greatly expands the scope of this prohibition
to include all Gentiles who have not received the status of resident
alien, a status currently impossible to bestow.55 Thus, in essence,
BABYLONIAN TALMUD, TRACTATE SANHEDRIN 37a.
See 1 SHELOMOH GOREN, MESHIV MILHAMAH 3 (1983) (Isr.) (discussing the
erroneous addition to the text of the Mishnah).
52 See id. at 6 (finding the human rights value to life to be universal).
53 See id. (alluding to the verse from Genesis 9:6).
54 Exodus 23:33 (Jewish Publication Society), available at http://www.israelbar-mitzvah.com/torah/exo023.htm#001.
55 See MOSHE BEN MAIMON, MISHNEH TORAH, HILCHOT AVODAT KOCHAVIM 10:6
(declaring that no gentile is allowed onto Jewish lands unless ―he has accepted
upon himself the Seven Commandments of the Sons of Noah,‖ in which case he is
classed as a ―settling stranger,‖ who will only be accepted onto Jewish lands ―at a
50
51
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Maimonides bans all Gentile settlement in a Jewish-controlled
Israel. However, Goren compiles the legal analysis of several other
medieval legalists—primarily that of the Ra‘avad—which together
produce a result more consistent with modern values. The
Ra‘avad asserts that the ban on Gentile settlement in Israel, but for
bestowing resident alien status, only applies when a requisite legal
body with the capacity to bestow such a status exists. However,
when that legal body does not exist, the ban on Gentile settlement
only applies to a smaller segment of the Gentile population, i.e.,
outright idolaters.56 Goren concludes that because Gentiles today
do not worship idols, they may not only possess property rights in
Israel, but they may also enjoy other rights granted to Gentiles who
‗lead orderly lives.‘57
In his legal analysis of the internment of Gentiles, Goren is
more circumspect. Although he unmistakably asserts that the
principle for the ways of peace demands that a Jew bury Gentile
corpses, Goren equivocates about cemeteries containing both
Jewish and Gentile corpses.58 The medieval consensus, Goren
states, prohibited mixed cemeteries as an extension of the
prohibition of burying a righteous person next to a villainous one.59
Despite this, Goren manages to locate the lone legal opinion that
permits mixed cemeteries, provided that the Gentile ‗led an orderly
life.‘60 In the end, Goren rejects this lone opinion on formal legal
grounds, but argues that it could be followed if a failure to do so
would engender hostility.61
Goren‘s liberal jurisprudence reflects the attempts of someone
within the Jewish legal system to harmonize traditional Jewish
time when the Jubilee is observed‖). Conversely, converts to the Jewish faith were
allowed complete access to Jewish lands under the Code of Maimonides. Id.
56 See SHELOMOH GOREN, MISHNAT HAMEDINAH 58 (1999) (Isr.) (limiting the
limitation on the right to land to idolaters).
57 Id. at 60–61. The phrase ―lead orderly lives‖ refers to people who abide by
the seven Noahide laws—a topic beyond the scope of this paper. In brief, these
laws encapsulate the bare minimum of an orderly society; the presence of a legal
system that prohibits murder, theft, adultery, etc.
58 See SHELOMOH GOREN, SEFER TORAT HAMEDINAH 289 (1996) (Isr.) (vacillating
on whether Jews and Gentiles may be buried in the same cemetery).
59 See id. at 290 (discussing the burial of Jews and Gentiles in the same
cemetery).
60 Id. at 294.
61 See id. at 295 (incorporating the principle of engendering hostility into the
discussion).
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legal mandates with modern universal values. According to
Goren, the debate within formal Jewish law is not whether the
basic human right to life applies universally or parochially; Jewish
law does not allow the murder of any innocent human being.
Instead, the law debates the gravity of murder as applied to
different victims, Jews and Gentiles. Goren argues for equal
gravity in murdering a Gentile or a Jew by interpreting an
authoritative source on the universal prohibition of murder. Few
legal scholars within the Jewish legal system accept source
criticism of the Talmud as a valid form of legal analysis. Goren‘s
use of it here demonstrates his innovative jurisprudence not only
in the harmonizing of Jewish law texts with modern universal
values, but also in the utilization of modern academic historical
analysis in positively ascertaining the original version of Jewish
legal texts. Additionally, his allusion to the Biblical verse that
states that God created humanity in God‘s own image—a principle
that few past Jewish legal scholars have employed—further
demonstrates Goren‘s innovative jurisprudence.
By finding
rationales in Jewish law to support a Gentile‘s right to life,
property, and dignity after death, Goren generates the practical
outcome of universal rights for Gentiles in Jewish law.
4.2. Shaul Yisraeli
Rabbi Shaul Yisraeli acknowledges the past deliberate
separation made by Jewish law between Jews and Gentiles.
However, he marks an important divergence from this segregation
in the modern world. In previous eras, Jewish law attempted to
distance Jews from idolatry and anything reminiscent of it.62 In
modern society—where idolatry has ceased to threaten the
integrity of the Jewish religion—Jewish law now mandates a
separation from Gentiles who reflect idolatry‘s detrimental
characteristics.63
He underscores the importance, in his
introduction to laws pertaining to Gentiles in Israel, that any
suspicion of Gentiles is only legitimate insofar as the Gentile in
question embodies those detrimental characteristics. Any person,

62 See SHAUL YISRAELI, SEFER ‗AMUD HAYEMINI 114–15 (1966) (Isr.) (detailing
past Jewish law jurisprudence regarding Jews and Gentiles).
63 Id. at 115.
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Yisraeli insists, who ‗leads an orderly life‘ deserves dignity and
respect.64
Yisraeli also argues for property rights for Gentiles according
to Jewish law. In the ancient period when the land of Israel
maintained a certain level of holiness, Gentiles could not own real
property in Israel; but today, claims Yisraeli, because Israel lacks
that same holiness, the prohibition against Gentile property rights
has consequently dissipated.65 Elaborating further, Yisraeli quotes
the same argument between Maimonides and the Ra‘avad as did
Goren.66 While agreeing with Goren‘s result, he offers a different
legal analysis. According to Yisraeli, Maimonides‘s prohibition on
allowing property rights in a Jewish-controlled Israel requires an
extremely high threshold for what constitutes a ―Jewish-controlled
Israel.‖ In order to consider Israel Jewish-controlled, Jewish
sovereignty in Israel must encompass national security in the face
of war, a majority of the worldwide Jewry settling in Israel, and
control of all of the land within the borders of ancient Israel or the
ability to exert control over all of ancient Israel.67 As these
requirements have not been met, all people may enjoy property
rights in the land of Israel.
Yisraeli does, however, share Goren‘s liberal jurisprudence. By
shifting Jewish law‘s seeming contempt for Gentiles—all of whom
presumably committed acts of idolatry—to a contempt for
―idolatrous‖ actions, Yisraeli tries to expunge the animosity
towards Gentiles from those within the Jewish legal system. The
laws remain the same, but the reality has changed. Given this,
Jews should not regard minorities in Israel with the same disdain
as they have in the past—when the Jews themselves lived as the
minority among an oppressive Gentile majority—because modern
people have different characteristics. According to Yisraeli, only
those individuals who engage in idolatrous actions deserve
contempt.
Yisraeli uses this same method to argue in favor of Gentile
property rights in Israel. By requiring an extremely improbable
factual test in order to trigger the law that would prohibit Gentile
Id.
See SHAUL YISRAELI, SEFER ERETS HEMDAH 208 (1958) (Isr.) (arguing that the
prohibition remains intact for the produce that must be tithed, a nominal issue).
66 YISRAELI, supra note 62, at 115.
67 Id. at 122.
64
65

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol32/iss4/3

WERMUTH.DOC

2011]

4/24/2011 9:53 AM

JEWISH LAW

1117

property rights, Yisraeli ensures Gentile property rights for the
foreseeable future. Yisraeli, like Goren, employs an innovative
jurisprudence to provide legal conclusions that echo modern
universal human rights.
4.3. Aharon Lichtenstein
Rabbi Dr. Aharon Lichtenstein begins his analysis of universal
values in Jewish law by presenting the following thesis:
―Whatever is demanded of [Jews] as part of [the assembly of Israel]
does not negate what is demanded of [Jews] simply as human
beings on a universal level, but rather comes in addition.‖68 As
proof of this assertion, he cites the statement made by Issi ben
Akiva in the Mekhilta, and interprets it as a challenge to the moral
integrity of the Jewish legal tradition.69 Could it be, questions Isi,
according to Lichtenstein, that a supposed superior moral code
allows less moral behavior, i.e., the murdering of Gentiles? The
rabbi‘s response implicitly accepts Issi‘s challenge by agreeing with
him. Of course, Jewish law does not condone the murder of
Gentiles or the violation of any other universal moral tenet.
Nevertheless, Jewish courts do not have jurisdiction over such
moral violations. Lichtenstein, through his interpretation of the
Mekhilta‘s recorded exchange, thereby asserts that Jews must
abide by both sets of precepts, regardless of whether the
imperative originates in universal human morality or in Jewish
law.70

68 AHARON LICHTENSTEIN, BY HIS LIGHT: CHARACTER AND VALUES IN THE
SERVICE OF GOD 21 (2d ed. 2003).
69 See id. at 23 (stating that Akiva challenges the moral integrity of the Jewish
law tradition by questioning a verse in Mishpatim (Shemot 21:14)). The verse
seems to indicate that a Jew is punished for murder only if he kills a fellow Jew
but not if the victim is a Gentile. To Akiva, such verses are inconceivable, since
they seem to indicate that crimes such as murder, ―which previously had been
forbidden to general humanity would now be permitted to Jews by the Torah.‖
Id.
70 See id.

[W]hatever is demanded of a person on a universal level is a priori
demanded of a Jew as well; Torah morality is at least as exacting as
general morality. . . . Thus, part of what is demanded of a [Jew] is
simply. . . what is demanded of every person as a human being.
Id.
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On the topic of the murder of Gentiles, Lichtenstein vigorously
opposes any laxity. The jurisdictional element does not affect
practice because the imperative to follow moral and legal
mandates does not depend on deterrence, but rather on the weight
of the divine command.71 Thus, when he asserts that the
prohibition against murder from the Decalogue applies to Gentiles
who lead orderly lives, he concludes that no difference exists
between the prohibitions against murdering a Jew and murdering
a Gentile.72 He further states that someone who murders Gentiles
in cold blood not only commits the serious crime of murder, but
also desecrates the name of God—a critical prohibition in Jewish
law.73
Lichtenstein, in broad strokes, provides the most liberal
jurisprudence in the area of human rights. Jews must secure
human rights for all people under Jewish authority. The corpora of
Jewish law remains silent on issues of universal human rights,
because universal morality comprises a separate set of laws
governing every human being, while Jewish law relates only to the
laws governing Jews. Therefore, Jews, by virtue of being human,
must behave in accordance with universal human rights values as
God commanded. Although he does not provide an analysis of
issues where universal human rights and Jewish law contradict
one another, Lichtenstein‘s method presents the most inclusive
jurisprudence on the intersection between Jewish law and
universal human rights.
4.4. Shlomo Aviner
Conversely, Rabbi Shlomo Aviner does not present a clear
picture of his view of Gentiles in Jewish law. Aviner asserts a
Biblical imperative to respect all human beings, yet he immediately
thereafter differentiates between the respect due to all humans and

71 See id. at 51 (―Chazal said, ‗Gadol ha-metzuveh ve-oseh,‘ thus placing at the
center or even at the apex of our spiritual lives the sense of being called and
commanded.‖).
72 David Bar-Hayim, Goyim Behalachah [Gentiles in the Halakhah], 5,
http://www.daatemet.org.il/articles/pdf/he_GentilesinHalacha.pdf.
73 See 2 AHARON LICHTENSTEIN, LEAVES OF FAITH: THE WORLD OF JEWISH LIVING
255 (2004) (incorporating the principle of Hillul Hashem into the discussion).
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the extreme love required of all Jews towards all other Jews.74
Aviner states that throughout the centuries of exile, Jews lacked the
physical capabilities to avenge their fallen brethren. But now, with
a strong army, they should take revenge on the Gentiles who
sought their destruction, striking fear in those who wish ill upon
the Jews by taking the battle to their gates.75
On the other hand, in the civilian context, he prohibits the
murder of Gentiles on the basis of both Jewish law and universal
principles of morality.76 The humanistic moral imperative to
respect another‘s bodily integrity binds a Jew, just as it binds all
others.77 He even quotes the Mekhilta, which interpreted the
prohibition to murder given at Mount Sinai as proof that Jewish
law creates an imperative that builds upon the humanistic moral
imperative, not one that supplants humanistic obligations.78
Aviner concludes from the discussion in the Mekhilta that a
Biblical prohibition to murder Gentiles exists, over which the court
of heaven has exclusive jurisdiction.79 He further states that
anyone who murders a Gentile not only transgresses the Biblical
prohibition of murder, but further damns himself by disgracing the
name of God, a crime which can only be absolved by capital
punishment.80
In the abstract, Aviner acknowledges a universal imperative
from within Jewish law to relate to all human beings as humans
without distinction by religion, race, sex, or status.81 However, in
practice, Aviner does not explain which human rights this
universal imperative demands, but does discriminate between the
human value of Gentiles and the human value of Jews.82 In Jewish
law, humans have rights because God created them in God‘s
image.83 God created some humans more in his image than
74 See SHLOMO AVINER, MASHIV HA-RUAH 32 (Gilad Helinger ed., 2006) (Isr.)
(discussing the love and respect for human beings).
75 Id. at 686.
76 Id. at 687–88.
77 Id. at 688.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 See 4 SHLOMO AVINER, SHU‘T SHE‘EILAT SHLOMO 286 (2001) (acknowledging
a universal human right to human dignity).
82 Id.
83 Id.
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others—these are Jews, according to Aviner.84 Thus, Jews receive
additional human rights beyond those afforded to Gentiles.85
Moreover, Gentiles as individuals unequivocally deserve property
rights in Israel from legal and moral standpoints.86 However,
Gentiles with whom a territorial conflict rages do not necessarily
have these rights, according to Jewish law.87 Because of this, the
Arab Gentile minority in Israel may stay in Israel only if they can
be trusted to abide by Israeli law and remain loyal to the state.88
Aviner determined that the current territorial conflict destroys the
trustworthiness of the Arab Gentile minority at least in this
manner.89 While in theory, the individual Arab Gentile deserves a
peaceful coexistence with the Israeli majority, as long as the
conflict continues, the protection of human rights for the Arab
Gentile minority remains tenuous.90
Aviner espouses quite hawkish ideas regarding the rights of
dissidents and the Arab Gentile population in Israel. He proclaims
that according to Jewish law, the Israeli army has an obligation to
engage in retaliatory actions and deterrence campaigns, as they see
fit, to quash terrorist activity.91 In reference to minority dissidents
who throw stones at Israeli citizens, Aviner assumes that they aim
to inflict mortal wounds on their victims, unless the size of the rock
or the distance between the attacker and victim precludes that
possibility.92 Aviner believes that Jewish law courts may inflict
excessive corporal punishments on people in order to deter others
from acting in the same way.93 Thus, the rabbinic court should put
those who throw stones at Israeli citizens to death on attempted
murder charges.94

Id.
See id. at 286–87 (asserting that additional human rights exist for Jews).
Aviner does not list these rights or allude to their scope.
86 Id. at 288.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 288–89.
89 Id. at 289.
90 Id.
91 See SHLOMO AVINER, AL HA‘ARETZ LEVETAH: SHU‘T INTIFADA 17 (1993/1994)
(discussing the permissibility of retaliatory military campaigns).
92 Id. at 21.
93 Id. at 22.
94 Id.
84
85
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Aviner continues to erode human rights protections of the lives
of dissident minorities using the Jewish law doctrine of ―Pursuer,‖
or self-defense of a third party. This doctrine requires any Jew
who witnesses someone pursuing another person with murderous
intentions to save the intended victim, even at the cost of the
pursuer‘s life.95 Under this doctrine, Aviner asserts that any Jew
who sees an aggressor lift a rock to throw at a Jewish victim, must
protect the would-be victim, even if that would require killing the
aggressor.96 This extreme portrayal of Jewish law doctrines does
not turn on the severity of the law, but rather on the extreme
finding of fact that all who throw stones do so with the intent to
murder.
Once Aviner assumes this extreme fact—which
undoubtedly reflects his political leanings—the application of
normal legal principles, such as the self-defense of a third party,
results in extreme conclusions.
Aviner further assumes that ongoing terrorist activity against
Israel puts Israel in a state of war with its aggressors.97 While he
prohibits collective punishment as contrary to Jewish law, he limits
that prohibition to times of peace.98 In war, Aviner asserts, Jewish
law does not require differentiation between actual aggressors and
civilians caught in the crossfire.99 Thus, citizens who harbor
terrorists—a category that includes stone throwers—may suffer
collective punishment, though such punishment should not match
the severity of the punishments doled out to actual terrorists.100
Aviner states that families and communities who do not hand over
their terrorist relatives and friends to the Israeli authorities deserve
to be punished as accomplices of terror.101 Furthermore, any
Gentile aligned with any terror organization against the State of

Id.
Id.
97 Id. at 24.
98 Id. at 23–24.
99 Id. at 24. This assertion concerning Jewish law has no support in any
authoritative legal text. Aviner instead backs up this claim with his own
exegetical interpretation of one of the wars waged by King Saul recorded in the
Bible. This interpretation does not properly explain the text and, even if it did,
would still require a logically invalid inference in order for this war to serve as
proof of such an assertion.
100 Id.
101 Id.
95
96
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Israel appears to lose all rights afforded by the state, under
Aviner‘s view of Jewish law.102
Although Aviner appears to espouse some progressive human
rights values, his extreme viewpoint on the Israel-Palestinian
conflict hinders the practical implementation of human rights,
according to his conception of Jewish law. He fabricates his own
hawkish Jewish law rules of war and applies them to the current
conflict in Israel. While he acknowledges a civilian value in
incorporating universal human rights into Jewish law, he abrogates
any concern for such rights during times of war or unrest.
4.5. David Bar-Hayim
Rabbi David Bar-Hayim espouses extreme views on Jewish law
concerning human rights. According to Bar-Hayim, a prohibition
on murdering Gentiles (not punishable in a Jewish temporal court)
exists in Jewish law without a clearly defined scope.103 While one
medieval legalist, the Ra‘avan, posits that this prohibition emerges
from the prohibition against murder in the Decalogue, the other
medieval legalists quoted, Maimonides included, do not agree.104
After alleging a non-existent consensus among medieval legalists
concerning the prohibition of murder committed against Gentiles,
Bar-Hayim concludes that a qualitative difference exists between
the prohibited acts of murdering a Jew and a Gentile.105 The claim
that the murder of either a Gentile or Jew carries the same
weight—with the exception that Jewish courts are only granted
jurisdiction over the murder of a Jew106—does not characterize
Jewish law correctly, according to Bar-Hayim. Under Bar-Hayim‘s
view of Jewish law, the murder of a Jew qualitatively carries
greater contempt than does the murder of a Gentile.
Bar-Hayim also claims that Jewish law permits the kidnapping
of Gentiles. He quotes two Tannaitic sources, one that bans
kidnapping without an express scope as to whom this ban applies
and a second source that limits the ban on kidnapping to Jewish
Id. at 75.
See Bar-Hayim, supra note 72, at 8 (discussing the variety of opinions on
the prohibition of murdering a Gentile).
104 Id. at 9.
105 Id.
106 See supra at 117–18 (explaining Rabbi Lichtenstein‘s opinion that
murdering a Gentile is as severe as murdering a Jew).
102
103
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victims only.107 Bar-Hayim harmonizes the two texts by limiting
the ban on kidnapping to Jewish victims, leaving no room for the
possibility that the prohibition covers all human victims.108 To
support this position, he uses Maimonides, whom he reads to
allow the kidnapping of Gentiles.109 He offers a similar argument
of silence to allow the injury of Gentiles.110
Bar-Hayim underscores this grave distinction in the human
rights of Jews and Gentiles with the outlandish exegetical claim
that Jewish law equates Gentiles to animals rather than humans.111
Except for the two cases where the legal sources force Bar-Hayim
to recognize a Gentile‘s right to life and property, he rationalizes
the disparity between Jews and Gentiles by likening Gentiles to
animals. Thus, humans typically feel hardly any compunction for
kidnapping or injuring an animal, especially relative to the
kidnapping and injuring of human beings. Because they are
considered animals under Bar-Hayim‘s extremist interpretation of
Jewish law, Gentiles are not afforded the same legal protection as
Jews. Under this theory, they are not legally protected from
kidnapping or intentional injury. To bolster this claim, Bar-Hayim
quotes several medieval and modern philosophical scholars who
appear to agree with him.112
His extremely antagonistic approach to human rights in Jewish
law harnesses the animosity built up over the long period of Jewish
persecution and unleashes it as fundamentalism for the modern
era. His jurisprudence solves any ambiguity in this context by
limiting its scope to Jews only. He then records the biased
opinions of medieval and modern thinkers—themselves
persecuted as members of a Jewish minority—and uses them as a
107 See Bar-Hayim, supra note 72, at 16 (discussing the kidnapping of
Gentiles).
108 Id. (discussing Bar-Hayim‘s failure to account for the possibility that these
two sources reflect divergent legal opinions).
109 Id. His reading of Maimonides is inconclusive and, at worst, specious.
Bar-Hayim argues from silence, claiming that because Maimonides did not
mention Gentiles when he codified the laws of kidnapping, the kidnapping of
Gentiles is therefore allowed. Such an argument ignores the likely possibility that
Maimonides‘s code of Jewish law contains gaps. To fill one such gap in this
manner reveals Bar-Hayim‘s a priori feelings towards ―the other.‖
110 Id. at 16–17.
111 Id. at 23.
112 Id. at 24–27.
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backdrop for his intense hatred and apathy towards the humanity
and the human rights of Gentiles.
4.6. Interim Summary
Following the establishment of the State of Israel, legalists
internal to the Jewish law system have a choice to make in the
context of human rights. Jewish law had developed in the fifteen
hundred years prior as a legal system for a dispersed minority
among an oft-antagonistic Gentile majority. The xenophobic
hatred emerging as a result of Jewish persecution and countless
massacres offers two divergent options for the modern legalist
enjoying majority status under Israeli statehood. Will Jewish law
shed its xenophobia, learn from its people‘s horrible persecution,
and ensure that any minority living under its authority enjoys the
respect and safety that Jews so desperately wanted and never
attained while a minority? Or will Jewish law continue to foster
the xenophobic attitude developed over centuries and unleash it on
the minorities under its rule? Some rabbis, such as Goren, Yisraeli,
and Lichtenstein, have chosen the former path and highlight the
tolerant themes in Jewish law while pragmatically interpreting
other legal issues to accord with modern human rights values.
Others, like Bar-Hayim, unequivocally choose the latter path and,
garnering support from the bloodstained pages of Jewish history
and its thinkers, fashion an extremely severe outlook on the human
value afforded to Gentiles under Jewish law. Yet, some, like
Aviner, straddle the fence. Although he occasionally reflects a
tolerance aligned with the former attitude, this open-mindedness is
often obscured by his hawkish nature. At other times, he seems to
subscribe to the latter approach while speaking of universal values
to avoid being labeled an extremist. These three approaches stated
by these rabbis represent values in the Jewish population in Israel
today. Regardless of the demographics and whom the masses of
religious Jews in Israel choose to follow, influential voices in
Jewish law offer a progressive jurisprudence that supports human
rights protections for Gentiles.
5.

THE APPROACH OF THE ISRAELI SUPREME COURT

The Modern Era has witnessed the expansion of both the
acceptance and the scope of human rights throughout the Western
world. Today, legal discussions about whether certain people in
society have a right to life or property seem rhetorical. Western
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secular courts punish all cold-blooded murderers regardless of
whose life they take. The legal discussions of human rights in
contemporary Western court systems explore issues such as
freedom of speech, religion, association, and the like. The same is
true of the Israeli legal system. In a society fraught with political,
religious, and military tensions, discussion of these freedoms
requires the court‘s attention.
A problem arises when trying to incorporate Jewish law as a
source for Modern Israeli law. The human rights values, sui generis
to the Modern Era, do not have explicit sources in the corpora of
Jewish law. In fact, depending on whose interpretation one
accepts, Jewish law can at times stand antithetical to modern
human rights values. This conundrum offers Israeli jurists the
opportunity to reject the use of Jewish law in these areas or to find
creative ways to base these modern freedoms on Jewish law
principles otherwise not discussed or developed in previous
centuries. When choosing the latter option, the Israeli secular court
jurists can interpret the law in ways barred to rabbinic Jewish law
scholars save for a few mavericks. Rabbinic Jewish law scholars
maintain a strict doctrine of stare decisis, which bars subsequent
legalists from overruling the decisions of past scholars. The secular
jurist does not have to abide by such a strict doctrine and is thus
able to favor modern methods of legal interpretation.
Justice Menachem Elon used this method of interpreting Jewish
law in the human rights context in Neiman v. Chairman of the Central
Elections Committee for the Eleventh Knesset.113 On the topic of
freedom of thought and speech, Justice Elon offers several sources
from Jewish law. He writes:
I believe there is no more penetrating and encompassing
description of the freedom of expression and the
importance of every individual opinion—even that of a
single individual—than the Talmudic statement regarding
the disputes between Bet Hillel and Bet Shammai: ―both
are the words of the living God‖ (B.T. Eruvin 13b; J.T.
Berakhot 1:4; J.T. Yevamot 1:6). . . . [T]he halakha is according
113 See generally EA 2/84 Neiman v. Chairman of the Cent. Elections Comm.
for the Eleventh Knesset 39(2) PD 225 (1985) (Isr.), translated in
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/84/020/000/Z01/84000020.z01.pdf
(discussing human rights and cautioning against strict adherence to a common
law doctrine, which might permit the spread of racism or hate).
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to Bet Hillel . . . but the views of Bet Shammai remained
legitimate and material in the world of the halakha. This
approach became characteristic of the halakha.114
In the context of legal discussions, although one version became
the law, the dissenting opinion remained an enduring voice in the
Jewish legal system. This plurality of voices that has survived in
Jewish law throughout the ages ―has the power to create harmony
and unity out of difference.‖115 The Jewish legal principle that
―both are the words of the living God,‖ provides a basis for
freedom of speech and thought. Justice Elon concludes that the
Jewish value in a plurality of voices,
. . . is the lesson of leadership and government in the
heritage of Israel—tolerance for every individual and every
group, according to their opinions and outlooks. And this
is the great secret of tolerance and listening to the other,
and the great potency of the right of every individual and
every group to express their opinions, that they are not only
essential to an orderly and enlightened regime but also vital
to its creative power.116
The Israeli Supreme Court (hereinafter ―the Court‖) explained
the universal right to human dignity and bodily integrity in Jewish
law in Katlan v. Prisons Service.117 In his opinion, Deputy President
Cohn locates the source for human dignity and bodily integrity in
the statements of the Mishnah in Tractate Sanhedrin:
The creation of humankind started with the creation of a
single individual to teach that whoever removes one single
soul from this world is regarded as if he had caused the
whole world to perish; and whoever keeps one single soul
alive in this world is regarded as having preserved the
whole world. And to preserve peace—that one person
should not say to another: ―my father is greater than your
114 Neiman, 39(2) PD at 294, translated in id. at 76. Halakha can be loosely
translated as ―Jewish law.‖
115 Neiman, 39(2) PD at 295, translated in id. at 77.
116 Neiman, 39(2) PD at 296, translated in id. at 78.
117 See generally HCJ 355/79 Katlan v. Prisons Service 34(3) PD 294 [1985]
(Isr.), translated in MENACHEM ELON ET AL., JEWISH LAW (MISHPAT IVRI): CASES AND
MATERIALS 441–47 (1999) (discussing the right to human dignity and bodily
integrity).
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father.‖ . . . Therefore, every person must say: ―The world
was created for me.‖118
Just as the world exists for the individual, it exists no less for any
other individual, states DP. Cohn.119 This principle, asserts DP.
Cohn, led Hillel the Elder to exclaim that all of Jewish law rests on
the following principle: do unto your friends as you would have
done unto you.120 Therefore, states DP. Cohn, Jewish law prohibits
the state from infringing on the bodily integrity and human dignity
of anyone because such infringement constitutes humiliation and
degradation to that person.
Deputy President Cohn interprets Jewish law similarly to those
internal to the Jewish law system. However, while he reflects the
interpretation of Rabbi Goren on the universality intended by the
statements in the Mishnah from Tractate Sanhedrin, he surpasses
scholars internal to Jewish law in his universal reading of Hillel‘s
statements. As demonstrated earlier, rabbinic and traditional
exegeses of Jewish law interpret references to ―friends‖ locally as
referring only to Jews. DP. Cohn, however, extends the reference
to ―your friends‖ in Hillel‘s statement to all human beings.
Furthermore, DP. Cohn develops a rule for human dignity,
ensuring that no action ―causes a person to be disgraced or
embarrassed‖ from studying the case law found in the Talmud.121
In the religious Jewish law tradition, scholars have never
developed a rule for human dignity, which they could apply to
other areas of law beyond the specific examples in the Talmud.
Traditionally, this principle remained confined to Talmudic
applications. The Court breaches this traditional approach by
applying the principle of human dignity beyond its traditional
confines.

118
119

at 444.

MISHNAH, NEZIKIN, TRACTATE SANHEDRIN 4:5.
Katlan, 34(3) PD at 11, translated in MENACHEM ELON ET AL., supra note 117,

120 Id.; see also BABYLONIAN TALMUD, TRACTATE SHABBAT 31a (citing the
original statement of Hillel the Elder).
121 Katlan, 34(3) PD at 12, translated in MENACHEM ELON ET AL., supra note 117,
at 445.
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In State of Israel v. Guetta,122 Deputy President Elon continues
the discussion of human dignity in Jewish law. The value assigned
to human dignity in Jewish law protects against ―the humiliation
or demeaning of the image of God in man.‖123 Jewish law places a
premium on the value of human dignity, explains DP. Elon, to the
extent that human dignity considerations trump rabbinic
legislation124 and, according to one source, even supersede Biblical
law.125 The Talmud offers the following example to elucidate this
legal hierarchy. The Biblical ban on wearing wool and linen
interwoven in the same garment is expanded in terms of both
potency and applicability in rabbinic legislation.126 If, however, the
rabbinic expansion of this ban conflicts with human dignity,
human dignity preempts the ban.127 This conflict might occur
when someone realizes that he is in fact wearing such prohibited
clothing while in public. In such a case, he need not remove his
clothing immediately. Instead he may wait until he returns home
to remove the banned clothing. Thus, states DP. Elon, this
principle prevents the state from conducting humiliating public
searches of any person, especially those requiring the person to
undress.128
DP. Elon greatly expands the scope of this legal discussion.
While rabbinic legal analysis limits the pertinence of this law to
Jews alone, the Court applies this law to all scenarios where
human dignity conflicts with law, especially to required public
122 See generally CrimA 2145/92 State of Israel v. Guetta 46(5) PD 704 [1992]
(Isr.), translated in MENACHEM ELON ET AL., supra note 117, at 449–53 (discussing the
permissibility of body searches in public).
123 Guetta, 46(5) PD at 724, translated in MENACHEM ELON ET AL., supra note
117, at 452.
124 Guetta, 46(5) PD at 724, translated in MENACHEM ELON ET AL., supra note
117, at 451; see also BABYLONIAN TALMUD, TRACTATE BERAKHOT 19b (citing the
original discussion of human dignity).
125 Guetta, 46(5) PD at 724, translated in MENACHEM ELON ET AL., supra note
117, at 451. See PALESTINIAN TALMUD, TRACTATE KILAYIM 40b (allowing human
dignity concerns to override Biblical law).
126 Guetta, 46(5) PD at 717–18, translated in MENACHEM ELON ET AL., supra note
117, at 451; see BABYLONIAN TALMUD, TRACTATE BERAKHOT 19b (citing the original
discussion of human dignity in the context of wearing clothing made of wool and
linen).
127 See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, supra note 124 (overruling the ban on interwoven
garments because of human dignity concerns).
128 Id.
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undress. The Court also reads the value of human dignity
universally, finding it to apply to all human beings, not just Jews.
The Court‘s tendency to interpret Jewish law universally
extended to the bioethical considerations on euthanasia in Shefer v.
State of Israel.129 In the context of passive euthanasia—withholding
life-sustaining treatment—the Court discusses the Jewish law
prohibition on withholding life-sustaining action as interpreted
from Leviticus 19:16, ―[y]ou shall not stand by the blood of your
fellow.‖130 From this and several other Jewish law sources, the
Court bans certain acts of euthanasia for all people.131
By extending this ban, this analysis not only neglects the
traditional interpretation of ―your fellow‖ in Jewish law, but it
bypasses the traditional approach to saving the life of Gentiles as
recorded in the Talmud.132 Jewish law states that this verse does
not apply to Gentiles.133 Furthermore, a Jew may only save the life
of a dying Gentile if to do otherwise would engender hostility from
the rest of the Gentile population.134 The analysis of the Court
expands the understanding of this verse in Jewish law to include
all human beings, while ignoring an explicitly contradictory
passage from the Talmud.135
In Dwaikat et al. v. State of Israel et al., the Court adjudicated a
dispute over land privately owned by Arab Gentile residents on
which a group of Israelis intended to establish a civilian
settlement.136 In this context, the Court unequivocally rejects the
129 See CA 506/88 Shefer v. State of Israel 48(1) PD 87, 132 [1993] (Isr.),
translated in http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/88/060/005/z01/88005060
.z01.pdf (discussing the permissibility of euthanasia).
130 Shefer, 48(1) PD at 108, translated in id. at 23. The opinion mistakenly states
that the source for the quoted verse is Leviticus 19:9. It is in fact Leviticus 19:16 as
recorded above.
131 Shefer, 48(1) PD at 194, translated in id. at 140.
132 BABYLONIAN TALMUD, TRACTATE AVODAH ZARAH 26a.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 This does not mean that the court has chosen to ignore this passage from
the Talmud. There is room for the court to interpret the passage from Tractate
Sanhedrin differently, for instance, as applying only to idolatrous Gentiles. Such
an interpretation would maintain the integrity of Jewish law texts and allow the
Court to validly explain the Biblical verse, Leviticus 19:16, as it did.
136 See generally HCJ 390/79 Dwaikat v. State of Israel 34(1) PD 1 [1980],
translated in ZAMIR & ZYSBLAT, supra note 6, at 379 (adjudicating a dispute over
Arab-owned land).
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notion that Jewish law allows Jews to deprive Gentiles of their
property in the State of Israel.137 As proof, the Court cites Leviticus
19:34, which demands equal treatment for the other who dwells in
the land of Israel.138 Unlike those internal to Jewish law who offer
apologetic rationales for affording property rights to Gentiles, the
Court finds positive affirmation from Jewish law, by overlooking
the legal formalities required for resident alien status, to support
universal human rights.
The Court discusses Jewish law‘s attitude towards minorities
under a Jewish government in Neiman.139 The Court, citing
Deuteronomy 23:8 (―you shall not abhor an Egyptian, for you were
a stranger in his land‖)140 asserts that Jewish law rejects racism.141
Despite Jewish enslavement by Egyptians for hundreds of years,
Jews may not hate the entire Egyptian nation for its past injustices.
Furthermore, any foreigner who chooses to live under Jewish
sovereignty must enjoy equal protection of laws, as the Bible states
in Numbers 9:14: ―[t]here shall be one law for you, whether
stranger or citizen of the country.‖142 After citing Biblical
protections for minorities, the Court discusses the many
protections afforded to resident aliens by Jewish law.143 The Court
lists several of these protections and applies this entire legal
analysis to any minority living in Israel today without mentioning
the discussion among Jewish law scholars of the modern inability
to bestow resident alien status according to Jewish law.
In Berger v. Haifa District Planning and Building Committee, the
Court elaborates on the Jewish law requirement of equal protection

Dwaikat, 34(1) PD at 11, translated in ZAMIR & ZYSBLAT, supra note 6, at 383.
Id. See Leviticus 19:34 (Jewish Publication Society of America) (―The
stranger who resides with you shall be to you as one of your citizens; you shall
love him as yourself, for you were strangers in the land of Egypt: I the Lord am
your God.‖).
139 See EA 2/84 Neiman v. of the Cen. Elections Comm. for the Eleventh
Knesset
39(2)
IsrSC
225,
300
[1985],
translated
in
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/84/020/000/Z01/84000020.z01.pdf
(discussing human rights).
140 Deuteronomy 23:8 (Jewish Publication Society of America).
141 Neiman, 39(2) IsrSC at 300, translated in http://elyon1.court.gov.il
/files_eng/84/020/000/Z01/84000020.z01.pdf at 85.
142 Numbers 9:14 (Jewish Publication Society of America).
143 Neiman, 39(2) IsrSC at 301, translated in http://elyon1.court.gov.il
/files_eng/84/020/000/Z01/84000020.z01.pdf at 86.
137
138
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to minorities under Jewish rule.144 After quoting several verses
establishing the requirement of due process and equal protection
for minorities,145 the Court offers a thematic survey of Jewish
history. When Jews lived as nearly helpless, dispersed minorities
among Gentile majorities, they suffered ceaseless, bitter
persecution and perennial massacres simply because their religious
faith differed from that of the surrounding majority.146 Thus, after
the Jews established their own sovereignty and consequent
majority, it behooves them to ensure the safety and equality of
minorities under their authority even more vigilantly than a new
State whose people have no experience with persecution as a
minority. In addition, the Jewish law precept to treat all people
equally because God created all humans in the image of God
bolsters such an attitude.147 Here, the Court explicitly embraces the
lesson from Jewish history it has chosen. Like many legalists
internal to the Jewish law system, the Court aims to protect the
rights of minorities living under Jewish sovereignty precisely
because the Court understands the devastation inherent in the
persecution of minorities. To ensure that Jewish law and Jewish
heritage reflect this lesson, the Court extended Jewish law to areas
barred to those scholars internal to the Jewish legal system.
6.

CONCLUSION

The modern jurisprudence of many Israeli rabbis and the
Supreme Court of Israel demonstrate that Jewish law can be
interpreted consistently with modern human rights values. After
Israel gained statehood, Jewish thinkers began fashioning a
jurisprudence that interpreted Jewish law in ways affording
Gentiles more protections and rights while under Jewish authority
in Israel. As they functioned within the Jewish law tradition,
previous generations had cemented authoritative interpretations
144 See generally HCJ 392/72 Berger v. Haifa District Planning and Building
Committee 27(2) IsrSC 764 [1973] (discussing the requirement of equal protection
to minorities).
145 See id. at 771; Exodus 12:49, Leviticus 24:22, Deuteronomy 1:16 (stating the
demand for equal protection and due process for minorities).
146 Berger, 27(2) IsrSC at 771.
147 Id.
See generally Menachem Elon, The „Other‟ in Jewish Law and in the
Decisions of the Supreme Court, 42 MADA‘EI HAYAHADUT 31 (2004) (Isr.) (elaborating
on the discussion of Gentiles in Jewish law and the differences in approach
between Supreme Court justices).
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that barred a full integration of the rights of Jews and Gentiles.
Nevertheless, they found creative ways to apply certain laws and
explain away other laws to ensure that Gentiles received certain
protections in Israel. However, while the rabbis have certain limits
on interpretation, the Court does not. It reads Jewish law through
a universal lens, deviating from traditional bars on interpretation
and rigorous adherence to legal formalities. By doing so, it extends
the traditional protections afforded to Jews and resident aliens to
all people within the authority of the Israeli government. The
Court and many Israeli rabbis manifest the belief that because of
past Jewish persecution, Jews and Israel should specifically protect
and ensure the rights of any minority within its authority.
Some Israeli rabbis espouse more radical ideas reminiscent of
the xenophobia engendered throughout the Diaspora.148 While
those rabbis have followers in the Israeli population,149 so too do
the many other rabbis who preach tolerance and respect.150 Jewish
law in the hands of modern Israeli rabbis and jurists has moved
and continues to move towards the modern, tolerant, and
universal approach to human rights. The issue of whether the
Jewish nature of Israel conflicts with the goals of a democratic state
can be debated. But human rights values in Jewish law as
interpreted by the Israel Supreme Court and many rabbis do not
pose any threat to democratic values in Israel.

148 See generally Yitzchak Blau, Ploughshares Into Swords: Contemporary
Religious Zionists and Moral Constraints, 34:4 TRADITION 39 (2000) (presenting an
overview of belligerent attitudes espoused by several modern Israeli rabbis).
149 See Ethan Bronner, Israelis Arrest West Bank Settler in Attacks, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 2, 2009, at A9 (providing an example of Israeli followers of radical rabbis).
150 See Rebecca Huberman, Bein Dam Le‟Dam, 33 AMUDIM 352 (1985) (Isr.)
(arguing for a Biblical ban on murder that applies universally).
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